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SECURITY INFORMATION

5 October 1952

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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
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FAR EAST

1. Limited objective operations by Communists in Korea to continue:

[Redacted]

Present Communist limited objective attacks along the whole front are to continue indefinitely, [Redacted]

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November.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] with increased air support promised by the USSR for mid-October, the Communists would be better able to protect their supply lines. If the supply situation becomes critical because of UN air action before the promised air support becomes available, it is alleged that the "negotiators at Panmunjom are prepared to take steps toward a cease-fire agreement."

Comment: In the past few weeks, enemy ground action has increased to an extent which would demand a larger volume of supplies.

[Redacted]

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2. Communists increase activity on Hainan Island:

[Redacted]


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Comment: The recent unprecedented air transport activity to and from Haikou and movement of an army headquarters to that city in September also suggest that the Communists fear an invasion of Hainan.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

3. Burmese request for Communist aid confirmed:

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
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notes were sent to Peiping and Moscow officially requesting economic aid for Burma last July, a few days after Nu publicly announced his intention of seeking such assistance.



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Comment:



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the Burmese not only requested aid, but were advised by Peiping to dispatch a mission to discuss the matter. On 30 August a small mission headed by the Minister of Land Nationalization left Rangoon for an extended tour of China and Russia, ostensibly to study land reform.

The Burmese explanation of Nu's request for Communist assistance was that he anticipated a rejection which would be embarrassing to the Chinese and Russians and would permit him to meet local Communist criticism that his government has not been neutral in accepting aid only from the Anglo-Americans.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Prime Minister Nehru urges settlement of Iranian oil issue:

 Indian Prime Minister Nehru told the American Ambassador on 1 October that he "earnestly hoped" that the United States would continue to impress Britain with the need for settling the Iranian oil dispute. Nehru hoped that a way could be found for transferring the 49,000,000 pounds desired by Mossadeq.

3.3(h)(2)

He stated that the Indian Ambassador in Tehran had been in close contact with Mossadeq in recent weeks and expressed concern for the security of the area in view of the Soviet pressures.

Comment: Nehru's suggestions reflect the continuing Indian support for Asian countries against Western "imperialism." The approval of Middle Eastern states generally has helped to keep Mossadeq obdurate.

5. New Lebanese President declares himself strongly pro-West:

 President Camille Chamoun has told the American Charge that there are no problems existing between the United States and Lebanon which cannot be settled now. In any war with the USSR, Lebanon would be wholly with the West and would make its facilities available regardless of formal agreements.

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Chamoun promised that Lebanese taxation of Point Four materials would cease and urged that American arms be made available immediately, promising to pay cash. Lebanon wishes to have one tough and heavily armed division for protection.

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Comment: There is no reason to question the honesty and intent of Chamoun. To remain in power, however, he will have to cope with the tough and experienced supporters of former President Khouri, as well as with strong independent elements.

6. Egyptian officers take cooperative line on Sudan question:

 Egyptian army officers assigned to the Sudan problem told British Embassy officials on 29 September that they believed Egyptian policy is now directed toward assuring independence for the Sudan before determining its eventual relations with Egypt.

3.3(h)(2)

The Egyptians believed that the Sudanese elections scheduled for November should be postponed for at least a month, while Egypt persuades all Sudanese parties to participate. The officers indicated they approve a British proposal for an international commission to supervise the elections.

Prime Minister Nagib subsequently told British Ambassador Stevenson that the Egyptian officers were expressing only their personal views, and that he would have to consult them, representatives of Sudanese parties currently in Caïro, and his Cabinet advisers before answering the British proposals.

Comment: Whatever Nagib's decision may be, these are the most favorable indications to date of Egypt's readiness to reverse its past policy and cooperate with Britain on the Sudan.

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7. Egyptian military regime determined to destroy Wafd:

[Redacted]

General Nagib is determined to destroy the Wafd Party, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Nagib reportedly intends to demand "purge committee" action against top Wafdist officials, including Nahas, the party's leader, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Salaheddin.

[Redacted]

Wafd Party

3.3(h)(2)

members plan to disperse to the provinces in order to publicize the Wafdist cause and to make it difficult for the army to take action against individual party members. [Redacted] the Wafd will not attempt to test the government's stand until after 8 October, the deadline date when all political groups must agree to the cabinet regulations.

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Comment:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Egypt's military government remains determined to dissolve the Wafd if the party executive maintains its defiant attitude.

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EASTERN EUROPE

8. Anti-Western campaign in Yugoslavia apparently in preparation:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
the editor of the large government-controlled newspaper Politika has been dismissed, together with the paper's foreign affairs writer and one other journalist. Ambassador Allen notes that while the editor has not been openly pro-Western, he has broadened the paper's news coverage.

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
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In addition, the Yugoslav Communist Party newspaper Borba carried an article on 1 October attacking those who strive to reimpose bourgeois democratic forms "in an attempt to destroy Socialist consciousness."

Comment: On 30 September the foreign affairs writer, now reported dismissed, informed a US Embassy officer that he expected a strong anti-Western propaganda campaign in the near future in support of internal policies. American officials in Belgrade have previously reported their belief that the campaign might include complaints against American information activities in Yugoslavia.


WESTERN EUROPE

9. Further reports on West German Socialist intention to compromise with West:



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Erich Ollenhauer, the new party leader, is trying to open the door for a compromise with the Western Powers and for his party's participation in the Bonn government after next year's election. Though Ollenhauer promised to continue the policies of Kurt Schumacher, he is reported to have rejected conference attempts to fight "Americanism," and to have side-tracked demands for large-scale public opposition to EDC and the contractual agreements.



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
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The present report does not describe the compromise Ollenhauer has in mind except to indicate that it would involve some revision of the Bonn and Paris treaties. In the past the Social Democrats have criticized the contractual agreement for denying Germany full equality of status, and have objected that the EDC does not include Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.

10. French cabinet approval for UN discussion of Tunisia seen in doubt:



French Foreign Minister Schuman fears that cabinet approval for inclusion of the Tunisian question in the UN General Assembly agenda may be prejudiced if there is public discussion of the American position favoring General Assembly consideration of this issue.


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Schuman had understood that the United States would not tell other UN delegations of its position and expressed his concern when he learned that the chief Pakistani delegate had been so informed.

Comment: French refusal to approve the General Assembly discussion of the Tunisian issue would mean considerable diplomatic embarrassment for the United States. Schuman previously anticipated that at its 7 October meeting the cabinet would decide not to oppose placing the question on the agenda.

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
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


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